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This paper provides estimates of the average returns to labour market
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workers. Using instrumental variables, I take into account endogeneity
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1 Introduction
During recent years, there has been a renewed considerable attention towards
the analysis of labour market transitions, employment duration and wage
growth, in particular its relation with labour market experience and firm
tenure. This is not surprisingly, as correctly estimating true returns to general
and specific skills accumulated in the labour market is fundamental to study
wage dispersion and its evolution over time.1
Different theoretical models answer the question of why wages grow as
experience and tenure accumulate, resulting in the concave profile observed
in the data. Human capital accumulation as individual investment in job
specific skills (Becker, 1964), theories of deferred compensation as incentive
mechanism (Lazear, 1981), and search and matching models (Burdett, 1978;
Jovanovic, 1979) are all able to explain these empirical stylised facts.
Studying the returns to general and specific skills in the labour market
turns out to be important for a couple of reasons. Firstly, it gives a pic-
ture of the overall individual wage growth over the life-cycle, with important
implications for individual well-being and for the overall wage distribution
(Farber, 1999). It is also a good discriminating test of human capital and
search models and their main implications in terms of accumulation (and
loss) of human and search capital. In this respect, it is essential to the
definition and evaluation of active labour market programs directed at em-
ploying different workers and for the evaluation of such programs in terms of
transferability of skills. Consequently, it has important implications for the
recent debate regarding the segmentation of labour markets into permanent
and fixed-term positions (Dustmann and Meghir, 2005). Finally, the slope
of wage-experience and tenure profiles is found to be different between coun-
tries with different institutional and wage setting bargaining environments,
revealing different structural characteristics of labour markets (Teulings and
Hartog, 1998).
1The first wawe of these studies, mainly published in the 80s, were exclusively focused
on the US labour market with papers by Mincer and Jovanovic (1981), Abraham and
Farber (1987), Altonji and Shakotko (1987), and Topel (1991). After almost 20 years, the
debate is still open and important recent contributions have been published proposing new
methodological advances or offering evidence on European labour markets, or both. In
this direction, Altonji and Williams (2005), Dustmann and Meghir (2005) and Beffy et al
(2006) represent the most important papers. On the other hand, there has been a recent
growing interest of empirical researchers for applications of such methods: Dustmann and
Pereira (2008), Munasinghe et al (2008), Zangelidis (2008), Kambourov and Manovskii
(2009) and Williams (2009) are very recent examples of studies that use similar methods
to analyse the relationship between wages, experience and firm tenure, mostly referring to
European labour markets.
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However, correctly estimating wage returns to experience and tenure is
not an easy task, as accurate empirical investigations show that OLS es-
timates can be biased due to endogeneity and omitted variable problems;
most importantly, the direction of the bias is ex ante ambiguous. This paper
uses and compares different estimators to identify the true average returns
to experience, calculated as the total number of months worked since en-
try in the labour market, and firm-specific tenure, obtained as the sum of
months worked by the same employer, on a sample of young Italian male
workers. Identification of returns to experience and firm tenure is obtained
by using instrumental variables methods. To control for endogeneity of gen-
eral and specific skills accumulation, I use age and deviations of tenure from
its own mean over the duration of a job as excluded instruments; I also use
information on displaced workers as suggested, by Dustmann and Meghir
(2005) as a further source of exogenous variation. As long as displacement
is exogenous (conditional on observables) and is not correlated with unob-
served components in the error term, this strategy allows to disentangle wage
growth generated by pure skill accumulation to wage growth due to worker’s
matching behaviour.2
The data used is from the Italian Administrative Social Security Archive
(INPS), in which detailed information about labour market histories of work-
ers employed in the private sector is available and matched with relevant
information about the current firm. From the dataset, I extract a subsample
of very young workers (younger than 25 at entry) to study wage growth in
early stages of the careers, as in this period most of wage increase takes place.
I limit my attention to male workers and separate the analysis for blue and
white collars.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the
literature and discusses the econometric framework for estimation of average
returns to experience and tenure. Section 3 is dedicated to the descriptive
analysis of job and wage mobility and to the estimation of wage equations
with various econometric methods. After discussing my results, in Section 4
I conclude.
2In a recent paper, Cingano (2003) studies returns to industrial districts in Italy using
data for two Northern provinces with similar methods. There are some differences between
the two papers. Firstly I focus on returns to experience and firm tenure using different
instruments and using panel data methods, whereas he is more focused on returns to
district tenure and estimates only cross section equations. What is more, my paper extends
his analysis to the whole country, being Italy an important example to strong heterogeneity
in labour market outcomes. I further discuss some other differences between the two papers
in the next sections.
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2 Literature and Framework
2.1 Related Studies
Empirical studies interpret experience as accumulation of general labour mar-
ket skills, while firm tenure is a proxy for accumulation of firm specific skills.
However, OLS estimates of standard wage equations including these two vari-
ables gives biased results; comparing workers with different levels of these
skills can bias results for a couple of reasons. As Altonji and Williams (2005)
discuss in their recent reassessment of the literature, differences in levels of
experience and tenure can be determined by the fact that workers who are
longer in the labour market are in better matches and have accumulated more
skills. The second reason is the underlying heterogeneity in the population
of workers: high ability workers are likely to have a stronger labour market
attachment and hence more experience.3
Early studies for the US labour market based on simple OLS regressions
indicate very large returns to tenure and experience when no control for indi-
vidual heterogeneity is taken into account. However, controlling for previous
labour market history can substantially reduce the effect of experience and
seniority on earnings (Mincer and Jovanovic, 1981). Recognising the bias de-
riving form individual and firm heterogeneity, other authors have proposed
different estimators to take into account the problems of selection and endo-
geneity of tenure and experience. Altonji and Shakotko (1987) use deviations
of tenure from the average sample observation on job match as instrument
for tenure, while Abraham and Farber (1987) present IV estimates using a
residual from a regression of tenure on completed job duration as instrument
for tenure. Both studies provide estimates of returns to tenure are far less
than the standard OLS. However, using information on workers that start
a new job, Topel (1991) finds there are substantial returns to job seniority
(similar to the OLS results).
In a very recent and relevant paper, Dustmann and Meghir (2005) solve
above problems identifying returns to experience and tenure using a sample of
German displaced workers. The intuition behind their identification strategy
is that of assuming displaced workers can be considered as a random sample of
the population, as the current status is not conditioned by their past choices,
but is substantially exogenous. The problem of ability bias still remains
3An additional source of bias encountered when estimating the average returns to ex-
perience is that workers with higher returns to experience are likely to spend less time
out of the labour market because the opportunity cost of not working is higher. This
determines that experience and returns to experience are positively correlated (Dustmann
and Meghir, 2005).
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because experience is correlated with the error term: in fact more productive
workers tend to stay longer in the labour market and/or have higher returns
to experience. In their paper, age effects as exclusion restrictions combined
with a control function estimator on displaced workers are used to estimate
unbiased returns to experience, firm- and sector-tenure.4
Finally, Cingano (2003) uses data for two northern Italian provinces to
look at returns that are neither firm-specific nor general but derive from
accumulation of district tenure (time spent in industrial districts). In his
paper, age and firm closure are used as instruments for experience and tenure,
while district tenure is instrumented with the proportion of employed workers
in district industries or the distance between residence and workplace for a
worker. Interestingly, he finds that returns to firm tenure and experience are
substantially higher when using IV methods (although barely significant, at
least for tenure), while no returns to district tenure is detected.5
2.2 Econometric Framework
In this section, I briefly discuss the econometric framework used in this paper
by following the notation proposed by Altonji and Williams (2005).
Consider the following wage equation:
lnwijt = β0 + β1Xijt + β2Tijt + εijt, (1)
where lnwijt is the log of real wage for worker i, working at firm j in period t,
X and T denote total labour market experience and firm tenure respectively,
and εijt is the error term.6
The latter can be decomposed as
εijt = µi + φij + uijt. (2)
The first one (µi) is an individual specific fixed effect, φij is a fixed job
match specific error component, while uijt represents measurement error in
4Neal (1995) and Parent (2000) show that once sector tenure is instrumented with
deviations from its own mean, estimated returns to firm tenure are substantially reduced.
5Various applications of above methodologies have been recently proposed in the lit-
erature. Williams (2009) and Zangelidis (2008) propose a set of different IV estimators
to compare experience and tenure profiles of union and non-union workers in the UK;
Dustmann and Pereira (2008) compare returns to general and specific skills of workers
in the UK and Germany; Munasinghe et al. (2008) consider the role of these returns in
shaping the gender differential in the US; Kamborouv and Manovskii (2009) analyse the
importance of occupational tenure.
6For expositional reasons I do not include any other control variable or non linear terms
in experience and tenure.
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wages.7 The key parameters to be estimated are β1 and β2, the effect of
an additional year of experience and tenure on wages respectively; estimates
with OLS methods are usually quite high for both variables. However, the
method is inappropriate because both experience and tenure are correlated
with the unobserved individual and job match components mentioned above.
Essentially, job match-specific heterogeneity is positively correlated with ex-
perience due to job shopping effects, while the correlation with tenure is
ambiguous: if workers and firms share the rents from the match, then there
is a positive correlation, while the correlation is negative if there is selection
due to voluntary quits (Topel, 1991). On the other hand, the individual
specific component µi is likely to be positively related to tenure with low
productivity workers having high quit and layoff propensities and then lower
tenure.
To better explain the source of bias, some auxiliary regressions for the
unobserved components on experience and tenure are specified. Consider
first the unobserved fixed job match error component φij. The auxiliary
regression is the following
φij = b1Xijt + b2Tijt + ξijt. (3)
In this context, it is necessary to sign the two coefficient, b1and b2. Firstly,
search and matching models imply that job shopping over a career induces
a positive correlation between Xijt and φij, suggesting a positive value for
b1. Secondly, workers will quit more frequently from low wage jobs than
from high wage jobs; if firms share returns from a good match, φij will be
negatively correlated with the layoff probability; this suggests that tenure
is positively related to φij and b2 is positive. However, Topel (1991) points
out that selection due to voluntary quits will lead to low tenure associated
with high φij, so b2 can be negative. In general, the sign of the tenure b2
parameter in the auxiliary regression is ambiguous.
Consider now the problem of individual heterogeneity. The auxiliary
regression is given by
µi = c1Xijt + c2Tijt + ωijt. (4)
Again, signing these parameters is not an easy task. Altonji and Williams
(2005) show that c1 is negative and c2 is positive. The latter is likely to
be positive as less able workers are more likely to quit or be laid off, which
leads to an upward biased estimate of the effect of tenure. In fact, if ability
7It is also possible to include in this decomposition another variable referring to the
time-varying match-specific component, however, I don’t consider additional difficulties in
this setting.
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is revealed over the duration of a match, then there is positive correlation
between individual ability and tenure. However, as Williams (2009) notes, in
strongly unionised markets, c2 can be negative, as high ability workers have
no incentive to work in sectors with a very compressed wage distribution.8
As a result, the biases in the OLS are given by
βOLS1 − β1 = b1 + c1,
βOLS2 − β2 = b2 + c2.
As far as experience is concerned, the direction of the bias is ambiguous,
because the job match component b1 and individual heterogeneity c1 go in
opposite directions. For tenure, the bias of c2 deriving form individual hetero-
geneity can be positive or negative, and the effect of job match heterogeneity
b2 can reinforce or offset the previous one. If unions are very strong, c2 can
zero or negative, and OLS estimates are downward bias.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data is a 1 : 90 random sample of workers obtained from the Italian
Social Security Institute (INPS) representative of the population of employed
workers in the private sector observed from 1985 to 1996. This is the most
important source of data for studying labour market dynamics in Italy. As in
other matched employer-employee data sets, each worker and each firm are
identified by a specific code during their permanence in the administrative
files; for every match, a new code, generated as a string from the firm and
worker’s codes, is created. As the match is destroyed, the worker and the
firm still continue maintaining their previous codes.9
Demographic characteristics of workers are matched with relevant infor-
mation regarding the firm, as sector of activity, number of employees, geo-
graphical area and type of contract. Given the longitudinal structure of the
data, it is possible to track the entire career of workers and easily construct
the variables object of study: total labour market experience is obtained as
the total sum of months worked since entry in the labour market; firm tenure
is the sum of months worked at a particular firm, while sector tenure is the
sum of months spent in a particular industry. As information regarding firm
8He also argues that the job match heterogeneity component should be very small for
heavily unionised workers.
9See Contini (2002) for more accurate description of the dataset.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
blue collars white collars
monthly wage 2529 (662) 3042 (930)
age 24.58 (3.79) 25.96 (3.50)
experience 3.92 (2.89) 4.15 (2.97)
tenure 2.23 (2.33) 2.68 (2.51)
sector tenure 3.14 (2.71) 3.43 (2.80)
1-20 employees 0.54 (0.49) 0.34 (0.47)
20-200 employees 0.30 (0.46) 0.29 (0.45)
200 + employees 0.16 (0.36) 0.37 (0.48)
energy 0.62 0.95
mining 7.21 5.61
metal 25.06 18.08
textile 20.58 10.36
construction 18.20 5.33
commerce 16.89 24.22
transport 4.94 4.64
credit 6.52 30.81
observations 214,563 57,107
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses.
Wages in thousands of Italian Lira.
Durations in months.
closure is also available, I can identify displaced workers as those that lost
their jobs upon firm closure. I construct a measure of monthly wage directly
comparable across workers.10
From the dataset, I extract a subsample of workers that entered the labour
market between 1985 and 1995; I use this sample of very young workers
(younger than 25 at entry) to study wage growth in early stages of the careers,
as in this period most of wage increase takes place. I limit my attention to
male workers and separate the analysis for blue and white collars.11 The
main descriptive statistics are in Table 1.
10Following Contini (2002), yearly wages are deflated with the CPI at 1996 prices. Then,
to make them comparable across workers with different number of days worked during the
year, the following adjustment is adopted: realwage=(yearly wage/days paid)*26 where
26 is the average number of days worked during the month. From the sample I also trim
wages below 700 and above 7200 thousands lira that correspond to the 0.025% of the wage
monthly distributions. The overall sample selection procedure is available upon request.
11In this data, as in other administrative archives, no information regarding education
level is provided.
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Figure 1: Average Number of Jobs by Experience
Before analysing returns to experience and tenure using econometric tech-
niques, I offer some evidence regarding the mobility process in the sample;
in particular I focus on job mobility and wage growth. This is an important
step before considering endogeneity and selection effects discussed above. In
Figure 1, I report the average number of jobs held for each year of experi-
ence dividing between blue and white collars. For blue collars, the average
number of jobs increases quite rapidly at the beginning of the career, at least
until the sixth year, afterwards I can observe a little decrease in the slope.
White collars workers hold fewer jobs, after 5 years in the market they have
less than 2.5 jobs against 3 for blue collars.12
As job changes can be motivated by many reasons, in Table 2 I tabulate
mobility patterns and average re-entry wages for stayers and movers, dividing
them by the number of months in unemployment.13 White collars are less
12These numbers are quite close to those reported by Dustmann and Meghir (2005) for
Germany, while are certainly quite lower from those found by Topel and Ward (1992) for
the US.
13Although the dataset is well suited to study labour force dynamics, some clarifications
regarding the characteristics of the data have to be provided in advance. First, precisely
defining the unemployment status is not immediate. When the worker-firm match is
interrupted, workers can exit to unemployment, to work in the public sector, as self-
employed or retire. As a consequence, although in the paper I refer to unemployment for
exposition reasons, it is important to remember that this state has to be interpreted as
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Table 2: Job Mobility and Average Wages
blue collars white collars
job mobility
stayers 76.76 82.36
job to job 9.08 8.91
6 mths 2.86 1.60
12 mths 1.96 1.12
18 mths 1.21 0.75
24 mths 0.78 0.56
average wages
stayers 2545 3083
job to job 2582 3081
6 mths 2435 2617
12 mths 2393 2576
18 mths 2397 2552
24 mths 2410 2591
Note: Wages in thousands of Italian Lira.
mobile, and job changes are characterised by quite short periods of unem-
ployment. Most of total job changers move directly to a new job, the figure
for blues collars is slightly higher, with almost 50% of transitions directed to
a new employer. The pattern for average wages indicates the expected neg-
ative relationship with unemployment duration; both blue and white collars
enjoy higher entry wages upon re-employment in case of a quit. White collar
stayers have higher wages than movers, the opposite is true for blue collars.
Till now, the analysis has been conducted on simple patterns of job mobil-
ity and average wages, however job changing behaviour can be determined by
wage growth differentials in the current and future job. Some workers could
move and accept lower wages in exchange for higher expected wage growth
in the new job (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002). To further investigate this
issue, Table 3 shows the distribution of wage changes both for stayers and
movers, distinguishing between sector changers and stayers. Average wage
growth is higher for movers than for stayers, and surprisingly higher for sec-
tor movers, at least for blue collars. Stayers increase their wages by about
5-6% per year, while wage growth is about 12% when moving.14 Interest-
“out of sample.” Secondly, identification of job-to-job transitions versus layoffs is based on
the duration of subsequent periods of unemployment.
14About half of job changes involve a sector change, both for blue and white collars,
while average wages of movers are higher for those that don’t change sector of activity,
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Table 3: Distribution of Wage Growth
blue collars white collars
within between between within between between
firms firms sectors firms firms sectors
10 percentile -0.111 -0.331 -0.371 -0.081 -0.335 -0.341
median 0.016 0.018 0.024 0.032 0.024 0.021
90 percentile 0.213 0.666 0.810 0.228 0.655 0.727
mean 0.050 0.123 0.160 0.066 0.126 0.138
variance 0.069 0.334 0.424 0.050 0.314 0.300
ingly, sector switchers have lower wage levels upon moving, buy benefit from
higher wage growth afterwards. As expected, the distribution of wage growth
is much more dispersed for movers than for stayers; looking at percentiles of
the distribution, it is immediately clear that there is much more variability
in wage offers for movers.
Wage dynamics for stayers, movers and sector movers as experience accu-
mulates are also considered in Figure 2 for the overall sample. The average
growth of monthly wages by years of experience indicates that stayers have a
somewhat flatter profile. Interestingly, between jobs average wage growth is
higher in the first years, as the average growth for those that change sector.
However, after 3 years of experience average wage growth is very similar for
all groups of workers. The difference in wage growth between movers and
stayers clearly declines as experience increases. In previous Table, I showed
this fact can be related to higher variance of wages accepted by those that
move in early stages of their careers. Search and matching models have clear
predictions regarding this job shopping effect: as jobs are experience goods,
and ability is not immediately revealed, higher variance of external offers is
most likely if workers have not sorted themselves in their preferred matches.
Very high mobility rates can signal low ability levels; gains from moving
can decline with the number of jobs held, indicating that the incentive for
improving matches declines with experience. To verify this conjecture, in
Table 4 I report results for regressions of the log of monthly wage on the
number of jobs held including age and year dummies. Results indicate that
workers having more jobs earn on average higher wages, at least blue col-
lars, even if the pattern is not monotonic. Quite surprisingly, white collars
movers don’t get much upon moving. The same regression is presented in
this is true for blue and white collars. This fact indicates that probably some skills are
specific to sectors and neither completely general nor firm specific.
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Figure 2: Average Wage Growth By Experience
the bottom panel of the Table including individual fixed effects. As long
as these estimates control for individual heterogeneity, this can shed some
preliminary light on the selection process discussed in the previous sections.
Interestingly, now the association between the number of jobs and wages is
reversed. Blue collars seem to be negatively selected, while more productive
white collars seem to be those that move more to get some wage gains, at
least up to 4 jobs. This indicates heterogeneity in individual ability is very
important in modelling transitions and wage gains.
Previous descriptive evidence shows search and matching considerations
play an important role in interpreting the mobility patterns of young Italian
male workers. In what follows I try to shed some light on returns to experi-
ence and tenure using more appropriate econometric techniques dealing with
endogeneity and selection problems.
3.2 Returns to Experience and Tenure
In previous sections I discussed in detail the sources of bias for OLS estimates
of returns to experience and tenure: as long as job search and matching effects
play a role, the unobserved match and individual components of the error
term are correlated with accumulation of general and specific skills. However,
the direction of the bias cannot be signed a priori, hence the empirical analysis
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Table 4: Wages and Number of Jobs
blue collars white collars
OLS
2nd Job 0.0100* -0.0113*
3rd Job 0.0130* -0.0206*
4th Job 0.0086* -0.0363*
5th Job 0.0082* -0.0464*
FE
2nd Job -0.0039* 0.0071*
3rd Job -0.0130* 0.0191*
4th Job -0.0233* 0.0063
5th Job -0.0345* -0.0088
Note: * denotes significance at 1% levels.
is an instrument to quantify the importance of above components.
To overcome endogeneity and selection problems, and provide unbiased
estimates of returns to tenure and experience, I use an instrumental variable
approach. First, I estimate four reduced forms, for experience, tenure and
relative squared terms. Experience is defined as the number of years (includ-
ing fraction of years) worked until the date of observation; tenure is defined
as the total number of years worked at the same firm. I use age (and age
squared) and deviations of tenure from its mean over the duration of a job
as instrument for experience and tenure (and their squared terms); the latter
instrument is defined as fTijt = Tijt− Tij where Tij is average tenure over the
duration of the job.15
Using deviations of tenure from the mean as instrument has been first
proposed by Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and recently used, among others,
by Dustmann and Pereira (2008); using age as instrument for experience has
been proposed by Dustmann and Meghir (2005) and used by Cingano (2003).
Following the latter two papers, I also include a dummy for displacement
for those workers that loose their jobs upon firm closure. This excluded
instrument is correlated with tenure and experience as is clearly related to
mobility. In this case, if firm closure is exogenous, conditional on observables,
the identifying assumption is that displaced represent a random sample of the
population of workers and their past labour history doesn’t affect the next
wage they accept. Age is correlated with experience because older workers
have on average more experience; on the other hand, individual deviations of
15When squared terms are added, instruments are (gTijt)2 = T 2ijt − (Tij)2.
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tenure from their own means are uncorrelated by construction with both the
individual fixed effect component and the permanent job match component
and should satisfy the exogenous variation condition. Reduced forms also
include dummies for year, sector, area of work, firm size, type of contract
and sector tenure.16
Formally, the estimated equation is the following
lnwijt = β0 + β1Xijt + β2Tijt + δ1dexpit + δ2ctenijt + ξijt, (5)
where Xijt is experience, Tijt is tenure, anddexpit and ctenijt are residuals from
previous reduced forms for tenure, experience and relative squared terms.17
Results are in Tables 5 and 6 for blue and white collars respectively. In the
first column of each Table, for comparison purposes, I report OLS estimates
of standard wage regressions in which all variables are treated as exogenous.18
Estimates of coefficients indicate there are some differences between the two
groups: white collars enjoy persistently higher returns to experience (3%
against 0.5% per year), while both of them do not get any return from tenure
(actually, these are negative and barely significant).19 When controlling for
selection and endogeneity in the second column of the Tables, things change
quite a lot. Both groups enjoy substantially higher returns to experience
(about 13% and 11% per year for white and blue collars), while returns to
tenure also increase to 1.5% per year for white collars and 0.7% for blue
collars. These results clearly indicate OLS estimates are downward biased
and that controlling for selection and search is important to obtain reliable
estimates of the effects of tenure and experience on individual wage growth.
Columns from 3 to 5 of Tables 5 and 6 report panel data estimates for
three different models. Firstly, fixed effects estimates indicate that blue
collars have higher returns to experience (13% against 7%), while returns
16In what follows, sector tenure is included in the regressions and treated as exogenous;
in the next subsection I deal with endogeneity problems related to the sector-specific match
components.
17Higher order terms are not reported but included in the regression and appropriately
instrumented. In next Tables I don’t even report coefficients estimates for reduced forms,
results are available upon request.
18A previous regression without sector tenure (not reported) gives the following results:
one year of experience increases wages by about 2% for blue collars and by 4.5% for
white collars, on the other hand, returns to tenure are 0.6% per year for the less skilled
individuals and about 1% for more skilled white collars. Squared terms have the expected
sign, showing concave wage-skill profiles.
19This is not a very surprising result, as including sector tenure both groups increase
their wages by about 2.5% per year from staying in the same sector. I further discuss the
role of sector tenure in the next subsection.
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Table 5: Experience and Tenure, Blue Collars
OLS IV IV FE IV GLS HausmanTaylor
1 2 3 4 5
experience 0.0054 0.1131 0.1325 0.0973 0.0300
(0.0014) (0.0058) (0.0203) (0.0028) (0.0008)
experience2 0.0007 -0.0062 -0.0068 -0.0063 -0.0014
(0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0000)
firm tenure -0.0054 0.0032 -0.0169 -0.0031 -0.0005
(0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0046) (0.0011) (0.0008)
firm tenure2 0.0007 -0.0000 0.0015 0.0006 0.0004
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0000)
overid p value 0.293 0.427 0.097
observations 214472 214472 208754 214472 214472
R2 0.17 0.10 0.07 0.13
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Sector tenure exogenous.
to tenure are negative for both groups.20 This result is partly confirmed by
random effects estimates in column 4 that indicates no returns to firm tenure
but again substantial returns to experience for both groups (about 10%).
Finally, in the last column, I eventually report results for a standard Hausman
and Taylor (1981) estimator in which all endogenous variables (experience,
tenure and sector tenure) are instrumented with deviations from their own
mean and some correlation between endogenous regressors and the individual
random effect is allowed.21 Results somewhat confirm previous findings with
positive returns to experience and no returns to firm tenure.
These estimates clearly indicate returns to experience are a fundamental
source of wage growth for young men in Italy, while firm tenure appears to
have small or nil effect on the capacity of increasing their earnings possibili-
ties. In particular, tenure effects are of no importance when using panel data
methods, while are of some relevance when using IV. Higher IV estimates
when compared to OLS indicate that selection effects induced by search and
matching considerations are negative, better workers do not tend to stay
longer employed and they have lower labour market experience. Theoret-
ically, the increase in returns to tenure when correcting for selection is a
20In this case, it is not possible to separately identify the effects of tenure and experience
as they increase by the same amount for workers that don’t change job. The coefficient
for experience is identified for those that change the job.
21In this case I don’t use information on age and displacement as in previous cases.
Hence, comparison must be careful.
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Table 6: Experience and Tenure, White Collars
OLS IV IV FE IV GLS HausmanTaylor
1 2 3 4 5
experience 0.0306 0.1312 0.0712 0.1041 0.0667
(0.0029) (0.0099) (0.0266) (0.0045) (0.0017)
experience2 -0.0005 -0.0065 -0.0030 -0.0045 -0.0024
(0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0001)
firm tenure -0.0012 0.0146 -0.0022 -0.0005 -0.0018
(0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0046) (0.0020) (0.0015)
firm tenure2 -0.0001 -0.0014 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001)
overid p value 0.243 0.493 0.105
observations 57093 57093 54625 57093 57093
R2 0.33 0.28 0.32 0.28
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Sector tenure exogenous.
prediction of a matching model, where workers with a high individual effects
in returns to tenure have strong incentives to move and match with a better
firm. But this is not probably the whole story. In fact, the selection effect
can be also explained by strong union presence in the labour market. As
Williams (2009) and Zangelidis (2008) discuss for the UK, wage policies in
strongly unionised labour markets (as Italy), oriented towards strong wage
compression, can neutralize endogenous and selection effects, so that indi-
viduals with lower ability accumulate more tenure and experience.22
On the other hand, it is possible to interpret this result as an upward bias
in IV estimates instead of a downward bias in OLS. Essentially instruments
have different effects on different individuals. If there is heterogeneity both
in the returns to experience and in preferences for work, IV returns are
representative only for a subsample of the population. If the subsample is not
randomly selected, the difference between OLS estimates and IV estimates
could be only a difference between average returns in the entire population
and average returns for that particular group. This is most likely if the
instruments are likely not to randomly select the latter group, because they
are more effective on individuals with certain characteristics.23
22See Boeri et al. (2001) for evidence on the importance of unions in Italy and compar-
ison with other countries.
23I further discuss the relevance of instruments and overidentification tests in the next
subsections.
15
Table 7: Experience, Tenure and Sector Tenure, Blue Collars
OLS IV IV FE IV GLS HausmanTaylor
1 2 3 4 5
experience 0.0054 0.1024 0.1634 0.1017 0.0300
(0.0010) (0.0059) (0.0235) (0.0032) (0.0008)
experience2 0.0007 -0.0063 -0.0088 -0.0066 -0.0014
(0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0000)
firm tenure -0.0054 -0.0068 -0.0064 0.0001 -0.0003
(0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0031) (0.0013) (0.0008)
firm tenure2 0.0007 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)
sector tenure 0.0265 -0.0401 -0.0609 -0.0436 0.0111
(0.0011) (0.0051) (0.0077) (0.0040) (0.0010)
sector tenure2 -0.0019 0.0038 0.0055 0.0040 -0.0008
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0001)
overid p value 0.088 0.423 0.064
observations 214472 214472 208754 214472 214472
R2 0.17 0.12 0.05 0.13
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
3.3 Further Issues: Sector Tenure
In Tables 7 and 8, I report estimates of the same equations by treating sector
tenure as an endogenous variable. As long as there is correlation between
sector tenure and sector-specific effects in the error term, previous estimates
would neglect an important aspect of the story, hence this new approach
should help to better analyse the relation between wage growth and skill
accumulation. As Parent (2000) suggested, deviations from the individual
sector mean tenure serve this purpose (as for firm tenure). Previous instru-
ments are as in the preceding section.
Including sector tenure as a further endogenous variable, it is immediately
clear that results for tenure and experience don’t change a lot. For both
blue and white collars, IV estimates in column 2 indicate high returns to
experience (10%) and in this case no returns to tenure, while returns to
sector tenure become negative and statistically significant when controlling
for selection and endogeneity. Panel data estimators do not show particular
differences with respect to those in Tables 5 and 6.
Although coefficients’ estimates do not differ a lot when including sec-
tor tenure, standard overidentification tests for instrumental variables show
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Table 8: Experience, Tenure and Sector Tenure. White Collars
OLS IV IV FE IV GLS HausmanTaylor
1 2 3 4 5
experience 0.0306 0.1097 0.0870 0.1046 0.0665
(0.0021) (0.0098) (0.0251) (0.0048) (0.0017)
experience2 -0.0005 -0.0054 -0.0037 -0.0048 -0.0024
(0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0001)
firm tenure -0.0012 -0.0012 0.0014 -0.0000 -0.0020
(0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0021) (0.0015)
firm tenure2 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
sector tenure 0.0284 -0.0264 -0.0187 -0.0252 0.0124
(0.0024) (0.0084) (0.0079) (0.0048) (0.0020)
sector tenure2 -0.0013 0.0024 0.0014 0.0021 -0.0010
(0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0001)
overid p value 0.056 0.475 0.092
observations 57093 57093 54625 57093 57093
R2 0.33 0.30 0.32 0.28
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
important differences. In what follows, I further discuss these issues and
compare my findings to those in the literature.
3.4 Discussion
In this section, I discuss in more detail results obtained in previous sections.
Firstly, I investigate the robustness of my results through a series of tests to
account for the relevance of instruments and identification of the model.24
Secondly, I compare my results to those obtained by Cingano (2003) for
two provinces in Italy and by Dustmann and Pereira (2008) for the UK
and Germany respectively. The different institutional settings of these two
countries in wage determination allow me to draw some conclusions regarding
the relevance of my results in comparison with the literature.
The relevance of instruments is considered through an F test on the overall
significance of excluded instruments in the first stage regressions, separately
on the sample of blue and white collars. Both test always return a value
bigger than 10, hence, excluded instruments are relevant for the estimation
24The complete battery of results is available upon request.
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of returns to experience and tenure. The quality of instruments and the
validation of their use is performed by checking their orthogonality with the
error term. The latter condition is verified with standard overidentifying
restriction tests on excluded instruments. I reported all of them in separate
row in Tables from 5 to 8. When treating sector tenure as exogenous, p
values of the Sargan statistic indicate that for both groups I cannot reject
the null that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, indicating
excluded instruments are safely excluded from the wage equation. Things
change when sector tenure is treated as endogenous; in this case p values
are much lower indicating the instruments can have some correlation with
the error term, at least some of them, invalidating the overall procedure.
However, the p value of Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests strongly rejects the null of
exogeneity of experience, tenure and sector tenure, indicating OLS methods
are inappropriate and IV methods must be used.
Finally, as far as identification is concerned, all models satisfy both the
order and rank condition. The former requires the number of instruments to
be higher than the number of endogenous variables, and in this case is easily
satisfied as there are more excluded instruments and endogenous variables;
the second requires that the rank of the matrix of the coefficients on the
instruments has maximum value as many as the reduced forms. I test the
null hypotheses of rank 3 and 5 respectively and obtain that the p-value for
this test is zero for both skilled and unskilled workers, decisively rejecting
the null.
Results obtained in this paper indicate there are substantial returns to
experience and small or insignificant returns to tenure. When considering
panel estimates, the same results is found with blue collars having flatter
wage growth profiles for each year of experience, I also find negative returns
to sector tenure. These findings are substantially in line with those found in
similar studies. For example, Cingano (2003) provides estimates of returns
to tenure and experience for two provinces in the North of Italy, including
district tenure as third source of wage growth. Comparability is not very
simple as there is a lot of heterogeneity across different regional contexts;
however, his estimates indicate a return on year of experience of 12% and
barely significant returns to firm tenure. He doesn’t find any evidence of
returns to district tenure (actually they are negative). Interestingly, this
study also finds that higher experience is associated with lower unobserved
productivity in the job, and the OLS bias is negative.
When comparing the Italian labour market with other European coun-
tries, the direction of the bias persists. A common finding in Dustmann and
Pereira (2008) for both Germany and the UK is that after controlling for
endogeneity and selection, returns to firm tenure drop to zero; this is true for
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both unskilled and medium skilled workers. On the other hand, returns to
experience are higher in Britain than in Germany (about 8% for unskilled and
9% for medium skilled against 9% and 3% for German workers respectively).
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I provide different estimates for the average returns to expe-
rience and firm-specific tenure for a sample of young Italian male workers in
the private sector. Using different empirical strategies, the relative contri-
bution of general and specific skills to overall wage growth is analysed and
theoretical considerations are discussed to explain the patterns found in the
data.
To overcome standard selection and endogeneity problems that arise when
past workers’ behaviour influences the wage outcome, I estimate wage equa-
tions using instrumental variables techniques on cross section and panel data;
in particular, the estimation method excludes age and deviations of tenure
from its mean over the duration of a job as instruments for experience and
tenure. I also consider a dummy of displacement as further excluded instru-
ment: as long as this is exogenous and correlated with mobility, displaced
workers can be considered as a random sample of the population.
Econometric estimates of returns to experience and tenure indicate both
white and blue collars enjoy substantial returns to general labour market
experience (about 9% per year with IV estimates); however, both groups
have very small or insignificant returns to firm tenure. Different panel data
estimators substantially confirm these results.
Reported estimates indicate the individual and job match components are
important in shaping the wage profile of young workers, and OLS estimates
of returns to experience are downward bias. There is some evidence of less
productive individuals staying longer in the market and accumulating more
experience; on the other hand, the increase in returns to tenure when correct-
ing for selection is a consistent with a matching model in which workers have
interest to move and find a good match. Still, heterogeneity in the returns to
experience and in preferences for work can also generate an upward bias in IV
returns when these estimates are representative only for a subsample of the
population. In general, the evidence indicates returns to general skills in the
labour market are more important than firm specific skills for wage growth
of young Italian workers. At least for this group, increasing participation is
of fundamental importance for better career prospects.
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